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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, over half a million American women were raped.' A quarter of
those women were raped by an intimate: a husband or ex-husband, a
boyfriend or ex-boyfriend.2 Women in America are six times more likely
than men to be the victim of a violent crime committed by an intimate,3 and
women are more likely to be injured in violent incidents committed by
intimates than in incidents committed by strangers.4 Violence is the leading
cause of injuries to American women ages fifteen to forty-four, more
common than car accidents, muggings, and cancer deaths combined5 Four
million American women are the victims of domestic violence each year.6
Three-quarters of American women will be victims of violent crimes
sometime during their lives.'
Faced with such facts, Congress passed the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA) in 1994.8 The many provisions of the Act were intended, as
the Act's name suggests, to respond to "the escalating problem of violence
1. See RONET BACHMAN & LINDA E. SALTZMAN. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 2 (1995).
2- See id. at 3.
3. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993); see also BACHMAN & SALMIztAN, supra note 1. at
3.
4. See BACHMAN & SALTZMAN, supra note 1. at 5.
5. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38.
6. See id
7. See idL
8. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
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against women." 9 Some of these provisions are uncontroversial; certainly,
nobody would question Congress's power to provide, as the Act does,
extensive federal funding to states to help states discourage violence against
women.1" Other parts of the Act have been challenged as unconstitutional
but have never been struck down by any court and seem clearly to be valid
exercises of congressional power. For example, courts have repeatedly
upheld as a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause1 those sections of the Act" that make it a federal crime to commit
domestic violence or to violate a protective order after crossing state lines
with the intention to commit such an act.' 3
The Act also creates a federal civil rights remedy for victims of gender-
motivated violence. 4 This provision's constitutionality is much less clear.
9. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37.
10. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300w-10. 3796gg, 10402(a) (1994).
11. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2262 (1994).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Page, 167 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (affirining by an
evenly split court a conviction under § 2261); United States v. Gluzman, 154 F.3d 49 (2d Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1257 (1999); United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758 (4th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). The provision of the Act that prohibits
possession of a firearm while under a domestic-violence restraining order. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
has also been challenged, and one court has held that that provision violates the Second
Amendment. See United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999). However, every
other court that has considered § 922(g)(8) has found it to be constitutional. See, e.g.. United
States v. Myers, No. 98-2560, 1999 WL 475571 (8th Cir. June 29, 1999) (rejecting Tenth
Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(8)); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d
215 (Ist Cir. 1999) (rejecting Fifth and Tenth Amendment challenges), United States v. Bostic,
168 F.3d 718 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting Fifth and Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause
challenges); United States v. Cunningham, 161 F.3d 1343 (11 th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a Commerce
Clause challenge); United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting Fifth and
Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause claims), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999); United
States v. Pierson, 139 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge): United
States v. Henson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 528 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (explicitly rejecting holding in
Emerson); United States v. Boyd, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (D. Kan. 1999) (rejecting Commerce
Clause, Ex Post Facto Clause, and Second and Fifth Amendment challenges).
14. This section provides in full:
§ 13981. Civil rights
(a) Purpose
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article
I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of this part to protect the civil rights of
victims of gender motivated violence and to promote public safety, health, and
activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause
of action for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender.
(b) Right to be free from crimes of violence
All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of
violence motivated by gender (as defined in subsection (d) of this section).
(c) Cause of action
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence
motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection
(b) of this section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of
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Most courts that have faced the question of § 13981's constitutionality have
ruled that it is a valid enactment under Congress's Commerce Clause
powers.'5 However, the Fourth Circuit and at least one federal district court
have held that the civil rights provision of VAWA is not a valid exercise of
congressional power under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth
Amendment.
16
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such
other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
(d) Definitions
For purposes of this section-
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a crime of violence
committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due. at least in part.
to an animus based on the victim's gender, and
(2) the term "crime of violence" means-
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person or
that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a
serious risk of physical injury to another, and that would come within the
meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of title 18.
whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges,
prosecution, or conviction and whether or not those acts were committed in
the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States;
and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described in
subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes
such action and the individual against whom such action is taken.
(e) Limitation and procedures
(1) Limitation
Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under subsection (c)
of this section for random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that
cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, to be motivated by
gender (within the meaning of subsection (d) of this section).
(2) No prior criminal action
Nothing in this section requires a prior criminal complaint. prosecution. or
conviction to establish the elements of a cause of action under subsection (c) of
this section.
(3) Concurrent jurisdiction
The Federal and State courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over actions
brought pursuant to this part.
(4) Supplemental jurisdiction
Neither section 1367 of title 28 nor subsection (c) of this section shall be
construed, by reason of a claim arising under such subsection, to confer on the
courts of the United States jurisdiction over any State law claim seeking the
establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property,
or child custody decree.
42 U.S.C. § 13981.
15. See, e.g., Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass. 1999); Liu v. Striuli. 36 F. Supp. 2d
452 (D.R.I. 1999); Mattison v. Click Corp. of Am., Civ. A. No. 97-CV-2736. 1998 WL 32597
(E.D. Pa. July 27, 1998); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Crisonino v.
New York City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp.
531 (N.D. 11. 1997); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (ED. Tenn. 1997); Doe v. Hartz. 970 F.
Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd on other grounds. 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998); Doe v.
Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
16. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999)
(en banc), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S. Sept. 28. 1999) (Nos. 99-5. 99-29); Bergeron v.
Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628 (M.D. La. 1999) (following the reasoning of. and reaching the same
conclusion as, Brzonkala).
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In this Note, I argue that the civil rights provision of VAWA is a valid
enactment under the Nineteenth Amendment, which granted women
suffrage. Part 11 demonstrates that the Nineteenth Amendment is about
more than voting alone; the Nineteenth Amendment also forbids the state
from interfering with women's political citizenship and full political
participation. Next, in Part III, I argue that a culture of violence against
women interferes with women's rights to be political citizens. For a person
to be a political citizen, she must be able to participate, free from
domination, as a self-determined equal, in the deliberation that is essential
to a republican form of government. But self-determination and equality are
difficult, if not impossible, in the face of an omnipresent threat of violence.
A culture of violence against women therefore interferes with women's
ability to participate fully in political life. Part IV sketches out the specific
requirements for congressional action under the Nineteenth Amendment-
that the legislation must be remedial and that the state must play a role in
the constitutional violation to be remedied-and establishes that VAWA
fulfills these requirements. In particular, I argue that the state helps create a
culture of violence against women because the state creates marriage,
which, when viewed in historical context, is shown to be an institution that
perpetuates women's subordination and violence against women. I
conclude that VAWA is valid legislation under the Nineteenth Amendment.
II. THE MEANING OF THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT
The Nineteenth Amendment 7 means both less and more than is
commonly thought. It means less in that it guarantees nobody the right to
vote; instead, it ensures only that the state will not interfere with the right to
vote because of a voter's gender. But it means more because it is, at its
heart, about more than merely the right to vote: It is about the right to be a
full political citizen. And in a country with republican roots, like ours,
being a full citizen means being an uncoerced participant in the country's
political deliberation.
The Nineteenth Amendment does not confer upon women a
constitutionally protected right to vote; it does, however, forbid interference
with the voting right on the basis of the gender of the qualified voter. The
Constitution "does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one." 8 The
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress shall have
power to enforce the article by appropriate legislation.").
18. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1875); see also, e.g., San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973) (" mhe right to vote, per se, is not a
constitutionally protected right .... ); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1876) ("The
Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one."). But cf Reynolds v.
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right to vote is a right conferred by states; 9 it is the state that determines
who will vote in federal elections.20 States may set certain limits on the
franchise. For example, a state may constitutionally prohibit a person from
voting if she fails to pass a literacy test.2' But there are constitutional
limitations on a state's ability to deny the right to vote.' The Constitution
tells us, for example, that an otherwise qualified voter may not be turned
away from the polls merely because she is black' or because she is
nineteen years old.' The Nineteenth Amendment is one such limitation.
While the Nineteenth Amendment does not actually confer the right to vote
on any particular woman, no woman (or man) may be denied the right to
vote simply because of her (or his) gender.
To understand the full meaning of the Nineteenth Amendment,
however, it is necessary to look beyond the plain text of the amendment to
the historical and political context in which the amendment was produced.'
This task is complicated by the fact that the vote had no single meaning to
the suffragists. As Aileen Kraditor states, "The woman suffrage movement
had no official ideology. Its members and leaders held every conceivable
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) ("Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the
right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections.").
19. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959)
("While... the Fourteenth Amendment... speaks of 'the tight to vote,' the right protected
'refers to the right to vote as established by the laws and constitution of the State.'" (citation
omitted)); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904) ("The privilege to vote in any State is not
given by the Federal Constitution, or by any of its amendments. It is not a privilege springing
from citizenship of the United States.... Mhe privilege to vote in a State is within the
jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct, and upon such terms as to it
may seem proper .. "), overruled on other grounds by Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972);
overruling recognized by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 n. I (1991).
20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; id. amend. XVII.
21. See Lassiter, 360 U.S. 45.
22. See, e.g., Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) ("Privilege of voting is not
derived from the United States, but is conferred by the State and, save as restrained by the
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments and other provisions of the Federal Constitution, the State
may condition suffrage as it deems appropriate." (emphasis added)), overruled on other grounds
by U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; Pope, 193 U.S. at 633 (" mhe conditions under which that right
[to vote] is to be exercised are matters for the states alone to prescribe, subject to the conditions of
the Federal Constitution .... " (emphasis added)); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 38 (1892)
("The Fifteenth Amendment exempted citizens of the United States from discrimination in the
exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. The
right to vote in the States comes from the States, but the right of exemption from the prohibited
discrimination comes from the United States. The first has not been granted or secured by the
Constitution of the United States, but the last has been."); cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. DisL, 411
U.S. at 35 n.78 (" [There is a] protected right, implicit in our constitutional system, to participate
in state elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters.
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
24. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXVI.
25. For another argument that, given proper attention to history, the Nineteenth Amendment
is best read as "a constitutional commitment to rectify [the] history of (women's] subordination,"
see Reva Siegel, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth Amendment: Reasoning About "the
Woman Question" in the Discourse of Sex Discrimination, in HISTORY. MEMORY, AND THE LAW
131, 132 (Austin Sarat & Thomas Keams eds., 1999).
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view of current events and represented every philosophical position."26 It is
safe to say, however, that one part of the suffragists' vision encompassed
republican values and ideology. After a brief review of the meaning of
republicanism, I look at some of the ways that republicanism manifested
itself in the arguments of the woman suffrage 27 movement. I then examine
republicanism as recently revived by a variety of scholars.
Defining republicanism is no simple task. Indeed, it was John Adams's
opinion that "[t]here is not a more unintelligible word in the English
language than republicanism.,,2 8 There are, however, a few themes that
appear repeatedly in the literature about republicanism. According to
republican views, suffrage comprised a package of political rights,
including the right to serve on a jury and the right to hold office.29 Suffrage,
that is, conferred the right to full citizenship, which meant active
participation in the political community. This active participation was
considered a good in itself.? Traditional republicanism also emphasized the
common good over individual self-interest,32 and held that to participate in
26. AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 1890-1920, at
xi (1981).
27. Suffragists referred to "woman suffrage," not "women's suffrage." For a brief
discussion of the term "woman suffrage," see JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The
Legacy of Woman Suffrage for the Voting Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 105 n.4 (1994).
28. Letter from John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren (Aug. 8, 1807). quoted in LINDA K.
KERBER, TOWARD AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF WOMEN 131 (1997).
29. See Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 465,
467-68 (1995) [hereinafter Amar, Women and the Constitution]; Vikram David Amar. Jury
Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203. 205 (1995)
[hereinafter Amar, Jury Service]; see also Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial
Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 290 (1998) ("According to Akhil Amar's thick theory of
Reconstruction rights, the category of political rights encompassed all the rights associated with
the republican tradition of political citizenship, including not just suffrage and officeholding but
also the right to sit on juries and the right to serve in the military." (emphasis added)). Mark
Tushnet takes a slightly different view. While he acknowledges the importance of the distinction
between civil and political rights, and states that it was clear to those in the nineteenth century that
"[political rights included voting," he argues that "[there was some controversy over what other
rights were political." Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal
Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HIST. 884, 887 (1987).
For example, some argued that sitting on juries was a civil right, while others claimed that it was a
political right. See id. For an in-depth discussion of the historical basis of the distinction between
civil and political rights, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 216-18 & 217 n.*. 258-66
& 260 n.* (1998).
30. Cf JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION (1991).
Shklar believes that the ballot is "a certificate of full membership in society." Id. at 2. Hlowever,
according to Shklar, although political citizenship is a badge of full citizenship, political
citizenship is not sufficient for someone actually to be a "recognized and active citizen." Id. at 64.
One must also be independent-that is, an "earner," one who is paid for the work he has done.
See id. This is fully consistent with the republican belief, discussed below, that a certain amount
of property was necessary for independence and full political participation. See infra text
accompanying note 75.
31. See, e.g., Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1663
(1988).
32. See, e.g., KERBER, supra note 28, at 136-37 (citing Gordon Wood and J.G.A. Pocock):
Nomi Maya Stoltzenberg, A Book of Laughter and Forgetting: Kalman's "Strange Career" and
Nineteenth Amendment
the political community, a person must possess civic virtue-that is, the
ability to work for the public good instead of merely for one's own private
ends.33 Those who did not possess civic virtue, which was the key to
effective participation (and hence to effective government), could not be
full political citizens.'
The woman suffrage movement used each of these themes to argue for
the ballot for women. For example, the suffragists were well aware of the
"packaged" nature of political rights.35 As one delegate to the 1852
Syracuse National Woman's Rights Convention, J. Elizabeth Jones,
proclaimed, the right to vote "includes all other rights. I want to go into the
Legislative Hall, sit on the Judicial Bench, and fill the Executive Chair."''
Jones saw the ability to vote and the ability to hold office as linked.
Similarly, in an 1867 speech at the Constitutional Convention of New York,
George William Curtis responded to arguments that if women were to vote,
then they would also have the right to sit on juries, hold office, and perform
military service, not by denying the connection between voting and these
rights and responsibilities, but rather by agreeing with each proposition and
arguing that women were suited to perform each duty."
Both suffragists' and anti-suffragists' visions of woman suffrage went
well beyond political rights, however. Some suffragists had an all-
encompassing view of the right to vote; they saw the ballot as "the symbol
and guarantee of all other rights," 3' and "the symbol of Equality for
Woman." 39 This was not an outlandish view: Soon after the Nineteenth
Amendment was ratified, a conservative Supreme Court similarly suggested
the Marketing of Civic Republicanism, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (1998) (reviewing LAURA
KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996)).
33. See, e.g., Isaac Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 AM. HIST. REv. 629,
630 (1982) (describing the virtuous republican man as "concerned primarily with the public
good.... not with private or selfish ends").
34. See KERBER, supra note 28, at 136-37.
35. Mark Tushnet claims that -[t]he adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment essentially
eliminated the need to distinguish between civil and political rights." Tushnet. supra note 29. at
887. However, while the distinction may have become less important or even irrelevant for men
after both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were ratified and all men were granted both
civil and political rights, for women, who were not enfranchised by the Fifteenth Amendment. the
distinction between political and civil rights still loomed large.
36. J. Elizabeth Jones, Address at Syracuse National Convention (Sept. 8-10, 1852). in THE
CONCISE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 129, 129 (Mar Jo Buhle & Paul Buhle eds., 1978)
[hereinafter CONCISE HISTORY].
37. See GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN 17. 18, 21-22 (New York.
American Equal Rights Ass'n 1867).
38. RESOLUTIONS OF THE SEVENTH NATIONAL WOMAN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION IN NEW
YORK (1856), reprinted in PUBLIC WOMEN. PUBLIC WORDS: A DOCUMEN'rARY HISTORY OF
AMERICAN FEMINISM 219, 220 (Dawn Keetley & John Pettegrew eds., 1997) [hereinafter PUBLIC
WOMEN].
39. Political Organization, WOMAN'S J., Jan. 8. 1870. reprinted in PUBLIC WOMEN. supra
note 38, at 253, 254.
2000] 789
The Yale Law Journal
that the amendment could be read as ratifying true equality for women. In
striking down a minimum wage law for women, the Court wrote,
In view of the great-not to say revolutionary--changes which
have taken place... in the contractual, political, and civil status of
women, culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment, it is not
unreasonable to say that these differences [between men and
women] have now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing
point.'
More narrowly, suffragists believed the vote would allow women to
participate, as full citizens, in community life. Women were of course
citizens before the Nineteenth Amendment, but, as the Supreme Court had
announced in 1874, women were not full, political citizens. That is, while
women were "citizen[s] from ... birth, and entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizenship," 4' their citizenship did not include the right to
vote.42 Suffragists were determined to move beyond this second-class
citizenship,43 referring to the ballot as providing "political recognition"
44
and "political equality." 45 The political equality imagined by the suffragists
involved full and equal participation in the public sphere.46 As Jane Addams
argued, the ballot would provide women with "natural participation in civic
life."47 Suffragists believed that the ballot would take women out of the
private sphere of the family and make them "member[s] of the
community." 48
While the suffragists welcomed the upheaval they thought would
accompany the vote, the anti-suffrage movement dreaded the revolutionary
40. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923), overruled on other grounds by
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). (Justice Holmes dissented in Adkins,
famously-and perhaps a bit grumpily-proclaiming that "[i]t will need more than the Nineteenth
Amendment to convince me that there are no differences between men and women." Id. at 569-
70.) The Court has not put Adkins's broad vision of the Nineteenth Amendment to further use.
41. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 170 (1875).
42. See id. at 170-78.
43. See generally Rogers M. Smith, "One United People": Second-Class Female Citizenship
and the American Quest for Community, I YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229 (1989) (tracing the
development of women's citizenship from the colonial era to the present).
44. Stephen S. Foster, Statement at the 1866 Woman's Rights Convention (May 10, 1866), in
CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 36, at 230, 231.
45. E.g., VICTORIA WOODHULL, MEMORIAL AND PETITION TO THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Dec. 19, 1870 & Jan. 11, 1871), reprinted in CONCISE
HISTORY, supra note 36, at 283, 286; NATIONAL WOMAN SUFFRAGE ASS'N, APPEAL AND
PETITION FOR A SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT (Nov. 10, 1876), reprinted in CONCISE HISTORY, supra
note 36, at 304, 306.
46. See ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 36-37 (1998).
47. Jane Addams, The Modem City and the Municipal Franchise for Women, Address Before
the NAWSA Convention (Feb. 7-13, 1906), in CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 36, at 371, 371.
48. Charlotte Perkins Stetson [later Gilman], The Ballot as an Improver of Motherhood,




potential of granting women the vote, fearing that it would destroy the
family.49 To anti-suffragists, the basic unit of society was the family, not the
individual.50 The husband served as the sole political representative of the
family. Because granting women the vote would allow them to be political
citizens, no longer represented by their husbands, woman suffrage would
"dissolve society into a heterogeneous mass of separate persons, whose
individual rather than family interests would thenceforth receive political
representation."' Historically, then, the Nineteenth Amendment is
"fundamentally about women's political participation." 52 This is consistent
with the republican idea that being a political citizen means more than just
casting a vote; it means active deliberation and participation in civic life.
Suffragists also emphasized the republican notions of the importance of
the common good and of the virtue of political participants. Aileen Kraditor
has argued that there were two main kinds of arguments for woman
suffrage: arguments from justice and arguments from expediency. 3 "Under
the term expediency are subsumed arguments that claim that woman
suffrage would benefit society," she explains.' These arguments stressed
"the ways in which [women] differed from men, and therefore had the duty
to contribute their special skills and experience to government." '" As
Clarina Howard Nichols, a delegate to the 1852 Syracuse Convention, put
it, "Woman must seek influence, independence, representation, that she
may have power to aid in the elevation of the human race .... [The
strongest reason why woman should seek a more elevated position, is
because her moral susceptibilities are greater than those of man."'
Arguments from expediency, then, are essentially arguments that women
should be granted the vote for the sake of the country.
The suffragists also argued, again consistently with republican
ideology, that because virtue was necessary for participation in public life,
there should not be universal suffrage? Many suffragists, most notably
49. See ELLEN CAROL DuBois, FEMiNISm AND SUFFRAGE: THE EME_%RGENCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848-1869. at 46-47 (1978).
50. See KRADrrOR, supra note 26, at 24.
51. Id. at 25. For an example of an anti-suffragist evoking the specter of the destruction of the
family, see Arguments Before the Committee on Privileges and Elections of the United States
Senate in Behalf of a Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Prohibiting
the Several States from Disfranchising United States Citizens on Account of Sex. 45th Cong. 44
(1878) (statement of Madeleine Vinton Dahlgren).
52. Amar, Women and the Constitution, supra note 29, at 473.
53. See KRADrrOR, supra note 26, at 43-74.
54. Id at 45 n.1.
55. Id at 66; see also DuBois, supra note 46, at 94-98 (discussing the shift from universal
suffrage arguments to arguments emphasizing the fundamental differences between women and
men).
56. Clarina Howard Nichols, Remarks at the 1852 Syracuse Convention (Sept. 8-10. 1852).
in CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 36, at 121, 121.
57. See KRADrrOR, supra note 26, at 131-38.
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Elizabeth Cady Stanton, explicitly argued that there should be educational
requirements for the franchise.5" These arguments depended, to some
extent, on racist and anti-immigrant views, but they also depended on a
belief in the importance of education and character. "We have long known
that the safety of a country rests upon the intelligence as much as upon the
character of its citizens," explained one suffragist.5 9 And Stanton, quoting
unspecified "forefathers," justified her position by proclaiming that "[tIhe
stability of a republic depends on the virtue and intelligence of the
people." 60 This is, of course, a classically republican formulation.
The influence of republican ideals did not end with the suffragists:
Republican themes have recently been revived by a variety of scholars,6
and while the emphasis of these scholars may be different from that of
earlier republicans, the two visions have much in common. In the neo-
republican vision, as in that of classical republicanism, citizens work
together to promote the common good,62 which they come to know through
active deliberation. Participation in deliberation is itself a good, regardless
of the outcome.63 A variety of viewpoints must be represented in the
deliberation; "[d]iscussion and deliberation depend for their legitimacy and
efficacy on the existence of conflicting views.'6 In the neo-republican
vision, individual rights are crucial, but not as an end in themselves; rather,
individual rights are crucial because they are a prerequisite to meaningful
deliberation and political participation. 65 And, finally, for deliberation to be
truly effective, all the participants must be equal. Otherwise, deliberation
58. See id. at 133-36; see also, e.g., Frances E.W. Harper, Woman's Political Future, Address
to the World's Congress of Representative Women (May 13, 1893). in PUBLIC WOMEN. supra
note 38, at 262, 263 ("I do not believe in unrestricted and universal suffrage for either men or
women. I believe in moral and educational tests.").
59. Elizabeth Burrill Curtis, The Present Crisis, WOMAN'S J., Oct. 2, 1897, reprinted in
PUBLIC WOMEN, supra note 38, at 264, 266.
60. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, An Educational Suffrage Qualification Necessar.. WOMAN'S J.,
Oct. 2, 1897, reprinted in PUBLIC WOMEN, supra note 38, at 264, 264.
61. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court. 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine
Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L, REV. 543 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
62. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493. 1503 (1988); Sunstem,
supra note 61, at 1554. At least one author has argued that republicanism may provide the basis
for a "feminine jurisprudence" because republicanism emphasizes the community-the common
good-rather than individual interests. See Sherry, supra note 61.
63. See Michelman, supra note 61, at 27 (stating that republicanism views political activity as
a "'benefit' on the ledger books of life").
64. Sunstein, supra note 61, at 1575-76; see also Michelman. supra note 61. at 27
("Normative reason... cannot be a solitary activity. Its exercise requires knowledge, including
self-knowledge, obtainable only by encounter with different outlooks in public argument." ).
Michelman develops more fully the argument that republicanism requires pluralism in
Michelman, supra note 62, at 1526-28.
65. See Sunstein, supra note 61, at 1551 (stating that rights are the "preconditions for or the
outcome of an undistorted deliberative process" and that "existence of realms of private
autonomy must be justified in public terms").
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deteriorates into "the imposition of outcomes by self-interested and
politically powerful private groups." ' True deliberation is not possible in
the presence of intimidation, manipulation, or great disparities in power.67
Before I continue with my argument, which relies to some extent on the
continuing relevance of republican ideals, a few words are in order about
what I am and am not claiming, for the "republican revival" has come
under heavy fire from those who dispute the revivalists' version of early
American history.' Republican revivalists, these critics claim, err when
they try to "root republicanism in history by proving that the Founders
revered republicanism." 69 These historians also doubt that it is sound to
place republicanism and liberalism in stark opposition, as do some of the
revivalists." My argument, however, does not rest on the presence of
republican ideals in the Constitution or in the Founding generation, and it
certainly does not rest on the complete exclusion of liberal ideology. I am
more interested in drawing out and expanding the strain of republican
ideology that appears, side by side with liberal ideology, in the arguments
and rhetoric of the suffragists themselves. Even as vigorous a critic of the
legal republican revival as Linda Kerber acknowledges that there has been a
"continuous presence throughout the history of American dissent of the
rhetoric of a commonwealth of cooperation and civic virtue .... This
resilient republican language fused with major liberal elements has
continued to be central to American political discourse . . . ."' It is the
vision of the dissenters that interests me. Therefore, as I use the suffragists'
republican arguments to suggest a reading of the Nineteenth Amendment
that takes republican concerns into account, I rely on the revivalists' work
to the extent that they describe aspects of republican ideology and ways to
66. Id. at 1550.
67. See id
68. The most extended attack on the republican revival comes in KAL.IA,. supra note 32,
especially at pages 167-80. A number of other historical and legal scholars have questioned the
historical conclusions drawn by the revivalists. See Stoltzenberg. supra note 32, at 1028 n.9
(listing critics of neo-republicanism). Critics have also attacked substantive aspects of neo-
republicanism. So, for example, Kalman warns that neo-republicanism may be problematic
because it can fit conservatives' ends so well. providing support for the likes of Lco Strauss and
Robert Bork: "[My concern here is] that neo-republicanism could be used to justify non-liberal
politics.... By this analysis, the republican revival would be fundamentally flawed because it is
the wrong tool to fix what is broken." Laura Kalman. Border Patrol: Reflections on tie Turn to
History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHA, L. REv. 87. 108-09 (1997); see also KAL.txAs. supra
note 32, at 209-10 & n.49 (citing substantive and normative arguments against republicanism).
(Of course, a similar objection could be raised about, say, logic.) Stolzcnberg's article, supra note
32, provides a strong argument in support of neo-republicanism and against both types of
criticism.
69. Kalman, supra note 68, at 96.
70. See, e.g., KALMAN, supra note 32, at 174 (citing Wood and Pocock to draw into question
the "binary reading" of the debate between liberalism and republicanism).
71. Kerber, supra note 31, at 1672.
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achieve republican goals, without necessarily relying on the revivalists'
historical claims.
Given the suffragists' republican rhetoric, then, and the persistence of
republican thought, one way to understand the meaning of the Nineteenth
Amendment is to read it through a republican lens. In particular, a
republican understanding of full citizenship helps explain why violence
against women interferes with women's ability to be political citizens. It is
to this question that I turn in the next Part.
III. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN INTERFERES WITH
POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP
Violence against women is a political issue because it interferes with
women's ability to be political citizens. Political citizenship in a republic
requires equal participation in deliberation by people who are able to be
free of the exercise of arbitrary power and to engage in self-determination.
A culture of violence against women allows men to dominate women and
forces women to reshape their actions, desires, and beliefs, thereby
interfering with their self-determination and, in this republican country,
with their full political participation.
Republicanism, unlike liberalism, does not conceive of liberty as the
mere absence of state interference. Rather, both historical and neo-
republicanism emphasize the importance of positive liberty.72
Republicanism holds that there can be no liberty unless a person is free
from the exercise of arbitrary power, whatever its source. This arbitrary
power may take the form of physical restraint or threat of punishment, or it
may also take the form of manipulation, that is, "the deceptive or non-
rational shaping of people's beliefs or desires, or the rigging of the
consequences of people's actions." 73 Without freedom from such
domination, a person is unable to be a full citizen. The suffragists knew this
well. For example, both Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucy Stone believed
that a wife's right to her own person-in particular, her right to be free
from forced sexual intercourse-was the "necessary foundation for equal
citizenship, without which all other legal reform would prove near
worthless." 74
In a republican government, therefore, some apparently private interests
become matters of political concern. For example, republican self-
72. See PHILIP PEfrIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 17-50
(1997) (arguing that historically, republicanism conceived of liberty as positive freedom from
arbitrary power).
73. It at 53.
74. Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2000) (manuscript at 54).
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government would not be possible without secure property interests:
Without an "unquestionably secure base of material support," a participant
in public affairs would be dependent on someone else for his livelihood and
thus would be motivated to act not by the common good, but rather by the
interests of his patron or "his own particular, immediate, and possibly
delusive material interest."75 Property is necessary for the personal
independence that is required to be a proper republican citizen.
A culture of violence against women is also a matter of political
importance. The fact of pervasive violence against women, like a lack of
property, may lead a person to make decisions based on something other
than a clear-minded evaluation of the best interests of the community.
Indeed, the relationship of men to women is paradigmatic of the kind of
dominance that republicanism seeks to eliminate.76 It does not matter that
not every woman is a victim of violence, nor every man a perpetrator.
Domination occurs because men have the capacity to interfere arbitrarily
with women's acts, and everybody knows this, even if the interference
never actually takes place. 7 Women, because they are women, live with a
constant fear of violence,78 and they adjust their lives accordingly. This is
true at a seemingly trivial level: More women than men carry their keys in
their hands when going to their cars, for example," and many women try
not to dress in a provocative manner' or leave the house after dark.8
The constant threat of danger works more profound changes as well. As
Robin West explains, because "[a] fully justified fear of acquisitive and
violent male sexuality... permeates many women's-perhaps all
women's-sexual and emotional self-definition," women "re-constitut[e]
themselves in a way that controls the danger and suppresses the fear." '
Men too face threats of violence, of course, but those threats are more
sporadic than the threats that women face, and men respond not by
redefining themselves, but rather by acting: "One responds to sporadic fear
75. Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property,
72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1329 (1987).
76. See, e.g., PErrrr, supra note 72, at 57, 85, 138-40.
77. See id. at 63-64.
78. See KENNEtH F. FERRARO, FEAR OF CIME INTERPRETING VICTIMIZATION RISK 85-100
(1995) (explaining that women are more afraid of crime than are men because any victimization
of women involves the possibility of sexual assault).
79. See MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR 18 (1989) (stating
that 82% of women and only 44% of men always carry their keys in their hands when going to
their cars; 20% of men never do, as opposed to only 4% of women).
80. See iL at 17 (stating that 58% of women and only 10% of men always try not to dress in a
provocative manner, 63% of men never try not to dress in a provocative manner, as compared
with only 18% of women).
81. See id. at 16 (stating that 72% of men never restrict themselves to going out only in the
daytime and that only 25% of women never so restrict themselves; 26% of women always restrict
themselves to going out in the daytime, as opposed to only 9% of men).
82. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique
of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S U. 81, 94 (1987).
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and the threat of sporadic violence by changing one's behavior."83 For
example, a man can change neighborhoods, leave a bar-room brawl, or
come home from war.84 In contrast, women, because they are women,
experience pervasive fear and pervasive threats and must actually redefine
themselves:
Women cannot eliminate the danger our sexuality poses by moving
to a safer neighborhood, any more than blacks can respond to the
danger their color poses by moving to a safer race .... We respond
to the pervasive threat of violent and acquisitive male sexuality
instead by changing ourselves, rather than responding to the
conditions which cause it."'
In a republican society, such distorted self-determination becomes a
political matter, for manipulation and domination must be eliminated to
achieve the equality and self-determination necessary for every participant
in the deliberation that makes a true republic. Violence against women
because they are women thus interferes with women's ability to be full.
political citizens.
IV. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT AS APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION UNDER THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT
There are two possible ways in which society can respond to a person
who lacks something required for effective participation in a republic. The
first response, traditionally associated with republicanism, is to exclude that
person from the franchise on the grounds that she will not be able to
participate effectively. The second is to change the circumstances that make
that person unable to participate effectively. For example, a society might
choose to exclude from political citizenship a person who does not have
enough property to be an effective, independent political citizen; that is, a
society might choose to have property requirements for the franchise. s6 But
most states eliminated statutory property requirements in the first half of the
nineteenth century, and today it seems clear that the Constitution does not
83. Id.
84. Some men, of course, do not have the option of leaving a dangerous environment. For
example, a man might not have the resources to move to a safer neighborhood and might feel that
there is no chance he will ever be able to change his situation. It is entirely possible that he too
will reconstitute himself in the face of a constant threat of violence; he too will be in
circumstances that impair his self-definition. Saying that women qua women experience a
constant threat of violence, and that men qua men do not, should not obscure that other factors can
make it difficult for men to engage in self-definition.
85. West, supra note 82, at 94.
86. See Michelman, supra note 75, at 1330.
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permit exclusion from the franchise due to lack of propertyY (For example,
the Constitution now explicitly forbids charging people to vote in federal
elections.)88 This leaves the second approach, which is to make sure that the
person acquires enough property to participate competentlyS9 And, in fact,
legislatures engage in all sorts of redistributive schemes, from wage and
hour laws, to housing codes,' to welfare programs. 9'
Similarly, the Nineteenth Amendment provides that a qualified voter
may not be denied the right to vote, to be a political participant, because of
her gender. If something interferes with a woman's full political
participation because she is a woman, the first option-exclusion-is not
permissible. Instead, the Constitution mandates that, if the state is in fact
complicit in the interference, whatever interferes with women's political
rights may be remedied. Violence against women interferes with women's
full political participation;9 2 some remedy is called for, and, as I
demonstrate below, Congress may be one source of that remedy.
There are two basic requirements for congressional action under the
Enforcement Clause of the Nineteenth Amendment, both of which are met
by the Violence Against Women Act. First, legislation under the Nineteenth
Amendment must be remedial, as defined by the Supreme Court. Second,
such legislation may address only those constitutional violations in which
the state plays a part. There is no Supreme Court case law that deals
directly with the issue of Congress's power under the Nineteenth
Amendment; however, the Enforcement Clause of the Nineteenth
Amendment is nearly identical to those of several other amendments,
including the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.93 In the discussion
that follows I use the Supreme Court's well-developed body of case law
regarding the limitations and possibilities of congressional power under
87. See id
88. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (abolishing "any poll tax or other tax" as a requirement
for voting in a federal election).
89. See Michelman, supra note 75, at 1330.
90. See id. at 1338.
91. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8, 265 (1970) (stating that welfare
rights are a statutory entitlement--" more like 'property' than a 'gratuity"' -and that " [ wlelfare .
by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same
opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the
community").
92. See supra Part III.
93. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation."), with id amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."), and id. amend. XV. § 2 ("The
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."). The similarity
between some of these clauses has been noted. See. e.g.. Lopez v. Monterey County, 119 S. C1.
693, 709 n.6 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court has "' always treated the nature
of the enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as
coextensive").
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these other amendments to shed light on Congress's Nineteenth
Amendment powers.
A. The Remedial Requirement
This Section briefly traces the history of congressional power under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and then focuses on the recent and
important development in the Court's Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence announced in City of Boerne v. Flores.94 Acknowledging the
analogy between Congress's Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendment
powers, I then show that, even given the Court's limitation of congressional
power in Boerne, VAWA is an appropriately remedial use of Congress's
Nineteenth Amendment powers.
1. Legislation Under the Nineteenth Amendment Must Be Remedial
The Supreme Court has, until recently, given Congress extremely broad
power under the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. The Court has held that the appropriate test to apply when
judging the powers of Congress under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments is the test laid down in McCulloch v. Maryland:95 "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional." 9
6
The Court has also ruled that, under the power conferred by the Civil
War amendments, Congress may prohibit behavior that is not in itself
unconstitutional. For example, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court upheld,
as a valid use of power conferred by the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that
stated that anyone who had completed the sixth grade at an American or
Puerto Rican school at which the primary language of instruction was not
English could not be denied the right to vote because of his inability to
94. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
95. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
96. Id. at 421, quoted in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (applying
the McCulloch test to the Fifteenth Amendment); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 64 1,
651 (1966) (applying the test to the Fourteenth Amendment); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339.
345-46 (1880) ("Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
[Thirteenth and Fourteenth] amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to
the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil
rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is
brought within the domain of congressional power."); cf. James Everard's Breweries v. Day. 265
U.S. 545, 558-59 (1924) (applying the McCulloch test to the Eighteenth Amendment).
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read, write, or understand English.97 The Court upheld this provision
notwithstanding the Court's decision in Lassiter v. Northampton County
Board of Elections98 that literacy requirements for voting were indeed
constitutional, barred by neither the Fourteenth nor Fifteenth Amendment.
The Court thus held that Congress may prohibit actions even if those
actions are themselves constitutional. This was not a controversial
proposition then, and remains uncontroversial today.99
More controversial was the Court's vision in Morgan of the extent of
Congress's enforcement power. The Court provided two alternative
grounds for its holding that the provision in question fell within Congress's
power to enact under the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the Court suggested
that the provision might have been meant by Congress to enhance Puerto
Ricans' political power and thus help gain "nondiscriminatory treatment in
public services for the entire Puerto Rican community." o Second, the
Court stated that Congress might have decided that the literacy provision
barred by the Act "constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause." '' The Court in Morgan seemed to accept
such a congressional conclusion even though the Court itself had already
held, in Lassiter, that literacy tests did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court's second holding has sometimes been characterized as
granting Congress the power "not just to punish violations, but also to
define and expand the scope of the Equal Protection Clause." "
The Court has not adhered to this broad view of Congress's power.
Congress's power to define the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment was
questioned in Oregon v. Mitchell 3 and in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
City of Rome,"M and specifically rejected in Boerne, ° which restricted
Congress's creative powers under the Civil War amendments' enforcement
97. Pub. L. No. 89-110, tit. I, § 4, 79 StaL 438 (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(e)(2) (1994)), cited in Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643 n. 1.
98. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
99. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 ("Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it
prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional ...."); City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156, 210 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It has never been seriously maintained... that
Congress can do no more than the judiciary to enforce the Amendments' commands."); James
Everard's Breweries, 265 U.S. at 558-59 (holding that under the Enforcement Clause of the
Eighteenth Amendment, Congress could prohibit the prescription of intoxicating liquor for
medicinal purposes, even though the amendment only prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquor for
beverage purposes).
100. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652.
101. Id. at 656.
102. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 255 n.l 1 (1995) (Stevens, J.. dissenting)
(emphasis added); see also, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick. 448 U.S. 448, 501 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (citing Morgan and South Carolina for the proposition that Congress has power to
"find... constitutional violations" under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
103. 400 U.S. 112, 209 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.); id. at 296 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
104. 446 U.S. at 220 n.8.
105. 521 U.S. at 527-28.
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clauses. Boerne held unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (RFRA),'06 in which Congress, acting under its Fourteenth
Amendment Enforcement Clause powers, mandated the highest level or
judicial scrutiny for any law, even one of general applicability, if that law
substantially burdened a person's exercise of religion. RFRA was
Congress's attempt to overrule the Court's prior decision, in Employment
Division v. Smith, 0 7 that a test balancing the burdening of an individual's
religious practice against the government's interest in that burden was not
appropriate for neutral, generally applicable laws.'08
Boerne set out three guidelines for congressional action under the Civil
War amendments. First, according to the Court, Congress's power under
the Civil War amendments is "remedial" rather than "substantive.""
Second, if Congress is to exercise its powers under the Civil War
amendments, there must first exist a constitutional wrong under the
amendment in question to be remedied or prevented."0 Third, Boerne
required Congress to devise a remedy for the wrong that was
"appropriate": There had to be "congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end." 11
Phrased another way, the Court ruled that Congress may enforce, but
not define, rights, 12 and identified the forbidden act of definition in two
separate ways. One way the Court knew that Congress was engaged in
definition, not enforcement, was that Congress's action contradicted a
previous action of the Court. Such a contradiction in itself indicated that
definition was occurring. 13 Thus the Court in Boerne could accommodate
the holdings of most of the relevant precedent, but had to renounce the
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
107. 494 U.S. 872(1990).
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a), (b) (stating that Congress's purpose was to reinstate the test
rejected by Smith).
109. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-28 (reviewing the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Court's earlier decisions regarding the remedial nature of Congress's power).
But see Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of
Boeme v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5. 109 YALE L.J. 115, 117 (1999)
(arguing that it was "the Framers' conviction that it would be Congress. and not the courts, that
would be the first reader, and primary enforcer, of the Fourteenth Amendment").
110. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct.
2199, 2207 (1999) (stating that Boerne holds that "for Congress to invoke § 5 [of the Fourteenth
Amendment], it must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
provisions").
111. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
112. See id. at 519-20.
113. See id. at 519 (explaining that Congress may not "alter[] the meaning" of a
constitutional provision or "chang[e] what [a constitutional] right is"): see also id. at 536 (" When
the political branches of the Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of
the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the
Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles ... and contrary
expectations must be disappointed.").
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"alternative" holding in Morgan that Congress could have determined,
notwithstanding Lassiter, that literacy tests constituted an invidious
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment." 4 One reason, then, that
RFRA failed is that it contradicted the Court's earlier holding in Smith.
RFRA also failed for a reason related to, but distinct from, the fact that
it defied an earlier decision of the Court: RFRA was definitional and not
remedial because the Court said that there was not a "proportionality or
congruence" between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
that Congress adopted to prevent or remedy that injury."' The important
change here was not that Congress's means had to meet certain standards;
Congress's actions have always had to be appropriate. The important
change was that the Court, not Congress, evaluated the appropriateness of
congressional action. Of course, even before Boerne the Court could-and
did-review Congress's actions under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to determine whether those actions were constitutional." 6 But
the test that the Court applied in the past to Congress's determinations of
both the wrong to be remedied and the appropriateness of that remedy was
the lowest level of scrutiny possible-a version of the "rational basis"
test."' While this deference to Congress was paid lip service in Boerne,"'
the Court's real point was that "Congress' discretion is not unlimited." "9
The text and the outcome of Boerne clearly show that it is now the province
of the Court to weigh conflicting considerations and determine the
appropriateness of legislation.
However, the Court did not state clearly in Boerne what factors it might
consider in future cases to determine the appropriateness of congressional
action. For example, while the lack of legislative history detailing a real
problem was relevant to the Court's determination in Boerne,'" that lack
was not dispositive. 2' Similarly, the Court seemed to base its decision on
114. See supra text accompanying notes 101-102.
115. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
116. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Morgan v. Katzenbach.
384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
117. See, e.g., Rome, 446 U.S. at 177 (upholding congressional action because "Congress
could rationally" have reached the conclusion that "it was proper" to enact the provisions in
question (emphasis added)); Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653 (" It is enough that we be able to perceive a
basis upon which the Congress might solve the conflict as it did."); South Carolina v. Katzenbach.
383 U.S. at 324 ("Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional
prohibition of racial discrimination in voting." (emphasis added)).
118. See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (citing Morgan for the propositions that Congress may
determine what legislation is needed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and that Congress's
"conclusions are entitled to much deference").
119. Id
120. See id. at 530-31 (discussing the lack of legislative history supportive of RFRA).
121. See id at 531-32 ("This lack of support in the legislative record ... is not RFRA's most
serious shortcoming. Judicial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state of the legislative
record Congress compiles but 'on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally
appointed to decide.' As a general matter, it is for Congress to determine the method by which it
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RFRA's lack of "termination dates, geographic restrictions, [and] egregious
predicates," 12 but then stated that none of these is required by Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
3
In short, the Court's decision in Boerne held that only remedial
legislation is appropriate under the Fourteenth Amendment. Boerne also
provided a definition of remedial: To be remedial, legislation must not
directly contradict previous Supreme Court precedent and must be
proportional and congruent to the evil to be remedied. Although the Court
made it clear that it may in the future submit congressional actions to fairly
strict scrutiny in determining whether legislation is proportional and
congruent, it did not provide clear guidelines for Congress to follow in
order to ensure the Court's approval of legislation.
2. VAWA Is Appropriately Remedial
Under the Supreme Court's current definition of "remedial," the
Violence Against Women Act is an appropriately remedial use of
congressional power under the Nineteenth Amendment. The constitutional
violation remedied is the existence of a culture of violence against women,
which prevents women from becoming fully participating political
citizens." There is extensive legislative history documenting the problem
of violence against women. The Act is also narrowly tailored: Although all
women are harmed by a culture of violence against women, the Act permits
only those women who are physically harmed by violence because of their
gender to bring a cause of action. And the Act does not contradict any
previous action of the Court.
Congress made extensive legislative findings that confirm that violence
against women is a serious problem in this country. Congressional reports
are full of statistics demonstrating the pervasiveness of violence against
will reach a decision." (citation omitted)). A more recent decision suggests that the Court will
place great weight on the lack of a legislative record identifying a history of constitutional
violations. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank.
119 S. Ct. 2199, 2207-10 (1999), the Court spent a good deal of time examining the legislative
history of the challenged act. The Court did state that "the lack of [evidence of constitutional
violations] in the legislative record is not determinative," id. at 2210, but in the very next
paragraph found that "[b]ecause of this lack [of evidencel, the provisions of [the act in question]
are 'so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that [they] cannot be
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior,"' id. (last
alteration in original) (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532), and that the act in question was therefore
not a proper use of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers.
122. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
123. See id.
124. See supra Part III.
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women,'15 and Congress held many hearings in which individual women
testified about their own or others' personal experiences with violence
against women." Such findings differ drastically from the legislative
history of RFRA, which as the Court stated in finding RFRA
unconstitutional, "lack[ed] examples of modem instances of generally
applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry" and "mention[ed] no
episodes occurring in the past 40 years." 27
In addition, the civil rights provision of the Act is narrowly tailored: It
is congruent and proportional to the serious constitutional violation it seeks
to remedy. Although all women, not just those who are actually victims of
the violence, suffer from a culture of violence against women, the Act
provides a cause of action only to women who have actually suffered
physical violence. Moreover, violence is actionable under the Act only if it
is violence "motivated by gender,"" and the violence must be so severe
that it would constitute a felony if criminally prosecuted." The Act might
be considered too broad because, notwithstanding the fact that there is no
evidence of violence against men because of their gender, the Act is not
limited to violence against women by men, but instead applies to any act of
violence, by man or woman, against anyone, if committed on account of the
victim's gender."3 But this argument proves too much. If it is correct, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 is likewise unconstitutional, since it prohibits
interference with voting "on account of race or color" '" and there is no
history of states' restricting white people's right to vote on account of their
race. Gender-neutral language simply meets the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause.' In addition, the Act makes no substantive change in
125. See, e.g., H. R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25-27 (1993); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37-38, 41-
42 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 33-34, 36-39 (1991); S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 27-33 (1990);
supra notes 3, 5-7 and accompanying text.
126. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 39 (describing five separate hearings that detailed the
problem of violence against women).
127. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530; see also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199,2207-10 (1999).
128. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994).
129. See id. § 13981(d)(2)(A) (defining" crime of violence").
130. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ.. 169 F.3d 820. 887 (4th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that the civil rights provision of VAWA is overbroad because, inter
alia, it is "written in gender-neutral terms and would presumably create a cause of action for a
male plaintiff, even though there is no evidence, or even any suggestion, that the States have
unconstitutionally enforced their laws that disproportionately affect men"), cert. granted, 68
U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1999) (Nos. 99-5,99-29).
131. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
132. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976). An equal protection argument also explains why the Act should cover same-
sex violence on account of gender. If the Act did not cover same-sex violence, a woman attacked
by a man because of gender would be protected, but a man attacked by a man because of gender
would not be protected. This discrimination against the male victim would constitute a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. For an elaboration of this sort of argument in the context of
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the law. It does not increase the level of judicial scrutiny for acts that
incidentally discriminate on the basis of gender."' Instead, the Act simply
provides a different remedy for acts that already would be considered
criminal. Therefore, VAWA is in harmony with the Supreme Court's case
law regarding congressional action under the enforcement clauses of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and is an appropriately remedial use
of Congress's analogous power under the Nineteenth Amendment.
B. The State Action Requirement
This Section establishes that Congress may act under the Nineteenth
Amendment only if the constitutional violations Congress addresses involve
state action of some sort. I first show that the plain language of the
Nineteenth Amendment and analogous cases decided under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments demonstrate that state involvement in a
constitutional violation is a prerequisite for congressional action under the
Nineteenth Amendment, and examine the scope of that state action
requirement. I then show that VAWA meets the state action requirement
under the Nineteenth Amendment, because the state creates marriage and
marriage contributes to a culture of violence against women, which
interferes with women's ability to be political citizens.
1. Legislation Under the Nineteenth Amendment Must Remedy
State Action
On its face, the Nineteenth Amendment prohibits only action by the
state:134 Private action standing alone cannot be unconstitutional under the
sodomy laws, see Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Lisw as Sex
Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988).
133. VAWA is thus immune to the sort of argument made by, for example, the dissenting
judge in Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1998) (Smith, J., dissenting). That
judge argued that after Boerne, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cannot be a valid
enactment under the Fourteenth Amendment because it increases the "level of judicial scrutiny
for states' actions that incidentally burden disabled persons." Id. He pointed out that the Supreme
Court has held that disabled people are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and that legislation
having incidental burdens on the disabled was permissible if it was rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose. See id. at 440 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985)). If this argument is correct, the ADA goes against this previous ruling of the
Supreme Court when it requires the state to demonstrate that it cannot reasonably accommodate
the disabled before the courts will validate the state's chosen policy. See id. at 44 1.
134. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." (emphasis
added)); cf U.S. CONST. amend. XV ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." (emphasis added)).
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Nineteenth Amendment. 135 More importantly for the purposes of this Note,
although "[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations
can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the
process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional,"'" the
Court has ruled that Congress may not act to remedy purely private action
under its Fifteenth Amendment powers. For example, in James v.
Bowman,3 7 the Court found that Congress had exceeded its powers when it
passed a statute that made it a crime for any person to interfere with the
right of suffrage granted by the Fifteenth Amendment: "[Tihe section
purports to be an exercise of the power granted to Congress by the Fifteenth
Amendment .... But that amendment relates solely to action 'by the
United States or by any state,' and does not contemplate wrongful
individual acts."' The Court concluded that "a statute which purports to
punish purely individual action cannot be sustained as an appropriate
exercise of the power conferred by the Fifteenth Amendment upon
Congress.. . ." " The Court has characterized Congress's power to enforce
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as "parallel," and has cited
Bowman to support its statement that congressional power under the
Fourteenth Amendment extends only to "the 'power to provide modes of
redress' against offensive state action." '0 And in Terry v. Adams, 4' Justice
Frankfurter stated that "[t]he [Fifteenth Amendment] command
against.., denial or abridgement [of the right to vote based on race or
color] is directed to the United States and to the individual States.
Therefore, violation of this Amendment and the enactments passed in
enforcement of it must involve the United States or a State." "42
135. Fifteenth Amendment cases provide support for this conclusion. For example. in Grovey
v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). the Court found that primary elections were not part of state
action, and thus the denial of the right to vote in a primary election did not violate the Fifteenth
Amendment. Grovey was overruled by Smith %'. Allvright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), but the way in
which it was overruled only emphasizes the state action requirement: The Court found that actions
taken at a primary were in fact state actions, and thus came within the purview of the Fifteenth
Amendment As the Court put it, the Fifteenth Amendment forbids - the abridgement by a State of
a citizen's right to vote.- ld. at 666. A primary was -state action within the meaning of the
Fifteenth Amendment." Id. at 664. In other words, Allwright only reiterated the necessity of state
action for court action under the Fifteenth Amendment. See also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461.
485 (1953) (Minton, J., dissenting) (stating that "this Court has power to redress a wrong under
[the Fifteenth] Amendment only if the wrong is done by the State").
136. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997).
137. 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
138. Id. at 136.
139. Id. at 139.
140. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518, 525 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
141. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
142. Id. at 473 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (emphasis added). Michael Les Benedict claims
that in the 1870s and 1880s, the Waite Supreme Court "sustained Congress's power to protect
voting rights against racially motivated private assaults." Michael Les Benedict, Preserving
Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. Cr. REV. 39. 73. To support this
claim, Benedict points to the cases of United States v. Harris. 106 U.S. 629 (1883). United States
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Griffin v. Breckenridge143 and United States v. Guest 44 have been
characterized as permitting legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to reach private action, 45 but in fact in both cases the Court
explicitly found that the right being protected did not stem from the
Fourteenth Amendment 46 and deferred the question of whether the statutes
in question could ever reach private action that interfered with rights that
stemmed only from the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 When the Court did
reach that question for the statute involved in Griffin, it made it clear that
the statute did not protect rights with a state action requirement from
infringement by private parties. 48 Therefore, legislation under the
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); and United States v. Butler, 25 F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D.S.C. 1877)
(No. 14,700). The key case for this proposition is Butler, which is not in fact a Supreme Court
case, but rather a case over which Chief Justice Waite presided while riding circuit. In that case,
which involved violence against black men who were trying to vote, Waite did seem to assume
that there was no state action requirement under the Fifteenth Amendment. See Butler, 25 F. Cas.
at 224. However, when faced with essentially the identical situation as arose in Butler, the
Supreme Court declined to reach the same conclusion, choosing to locate the right to vote in a
congressional election not in the Fifteenth Amendment, but in a part of the Constitution that had
no state action requirement. See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1884). As for
Cruikshank and Harris, both simply limit the application of statutes passed under Congress's
Fifteenth Amendment powers on grounds other than a lack of state action. See Harris, 106 U.S. at
637; Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 555. In both cases the Court also found, on the basis of Fourteenth
Amendment's state action requirement, that the sections in question could not apply to private
action. See Harris, 106 U.S. at 637-39; Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554-55. To conclude that there is
no state action requirement for the Fifteenth Amendment simply because the Court chose different
grounds on which to invalidate the statutes in question seems an unwarranted leap-an
extraordinarily strong version of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
143. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
144. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
145. See Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 98 (1992) [hereinafter Victims of the System] (statement of
Burt Neuborne, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law).
146. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 106; Guest, 383 U.S. at 759 n.17.
147. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 107; Guest, 383 U.S. at 754-55.
148. See United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1983); see
also Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274-78 (1993) (reiterating the
requirement that for a conspiracy to be actionable under § 1985(3), it must involve an intent to
"deprive persons of a right guaranteed against private impairment"). Neuborne tried to
distinguish VAWA from § 1985(3) on the grounds that
§ 1985(3)... was intended to operate solely as a conduit for substantive rights created
elsewhere, [but the civil rights provision of VAWA] is carefully designed to itself
create a federal statutory right to be free from gender-motivated assault. As the Court
noted in [United Brotherhood], if § 1985(3) had itself created the rights in question,
either pursuant to the commerce clause or Section 5 of the [Fourteenth] Amendment,
Congress would have been clearly empowered to act against private violence.
Victims of the System, supra note 145, at 99 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Neubome's
claim is, however, based a mischaracterization of United Brotherhood, which actually said only
that legislation under the Commerce Clause could create the right to be free from purely private
action. See United Bhd., 463 U.S. at 833. The case nowhere states that legislation under the
Fourteenth Amendment may proscribe purely private action. (Congress can, however, proscribe




Fourteenth-and by implication the Nineteenth-Amendment may not
reach purely private action.
2. VAWA Remedies State Action
a. The Nature of the State Action Requirement
Although legislation passed under the Nineteenth Amendment must
remedy state action, the state action involved need be neither exclusive,"9
nor direct,"S nor obvious.' As the Court has stated in the context of the
Fourteenth Amendment, "In a variety of situations the Court has found
state action of a nature sufficient to create rights under the [Fourteenth
Amendment] even though the participation of the State was peripheral, or
its action was only one of several co-operative forces leading to the
constitutional violation." 1
52
In one case, the Court found that a restaurant owner who leased space
in a public building could be enjoined from refusing to serve the plaintiff
because of the plaintiffs race. 53 The Court found that the state action in
that case was public ownership of the building, but the Court did not enjoin
the state action directly-that is, the Court did not say that the state had, for
example, to sell the building. Instead, the Court found that it was within the
power of the judiciary to reach the private component of the action and
order the restaurant owner to allow black people into his restaurant.
Similarly, the Court has found that the Fourteenth Amendment means
that racially restrictive covenants created by private individuals are
unenforceable." 4 The Court reached this conclusion even though, in the
cases before it, no action by state legislatures or city councils was involved,
and "the particular patterns of discrimination and the areas in which the
restrictions are to operate, are determined, in the first instance, by the terms
of agreements among private individuals." 5 The Court found the requisite
state action in the lower court's mere enforcement of the private covenants:
"[I]n granting judicial enforcement of the [private] restrictive agreements in
149. Cf. Guest, 383 U.S. at 755 (stating that state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment need not have been the only factor that contributed to the constitutional violation).
150. Cf. id. (stating that state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment need not
be direct).
151. Cf Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715. 722 (1961) (emphasizing the
importance of discovering the "true significance" of the " nonobvious involvement of the State"
for the purposes of evaluating a possible violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
152. Guest, 383 U.S. at 755-56.
153. See Burton, 365 U.S. 715.
154. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see also Barrows v. Jackson. 346 U.S. 249
(1953) (holding that a state-court award for damages for breach of a racially restrictive covenant
constitutes state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment).
155. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13.
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these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the
laws and... therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand." 156
The Court also found that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade trespass
convictions resulting from an attempt by blacks to be served in a private
restaurant that had traditionally been whites-only.'57 Again, the Court made
such a finding notwithstanding the fact that there was no statute or
ordinance requiring segregated restaurants. The Court instead focused on
public statements made by the city's mayor and superintendent of police
opposing sit-ins.'58 Although neither statement had explicitly commanded
that places of business or restaurants be segregated, the Court held that the
statements were sufficient state actions to trigger the power of the
Fourteenth Amendment and invalidate the trespass convictions.'59 In short,
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that, while legislation
enacted under the Nineteenth Amendment is permitted to remedy only
constitutional violations in which the state plays a part, such legislation may
reach private action that combines with nonexclusive, indirect, nonobvious
state action to create those constitutional violations.
b. Marriage as State Action
VAWA meets the state action requirement for congressional action
under the Nineteenth Amendment because the state plays an active role in
the creation of a culture of violence against women. Specifically, states
create marriage,"6 which is a cooperative force that leads to such a
culture.' 61 Clearly marriage itself is not a sufficient condition for violence
against women to occur; a marriage without a violent private actor will not
be a violent marriage. Nor is marriage a necessary condition for violence
against women. Many individual marriages are positive goods; thus I do not
here advocate the abolition of marriage. Nonetheless, historically, law and
culture have worked together to create the current idea of marriage-an
156. Id. at 20.
157. See Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
158. See id. at 270-72.
159. See id. at 273-74.
160. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993) ("Mamage is state-conferred
legal partnership status .... ); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry.
I LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 13 (1991) ("Marriage is ... a complete creation of the law, secular or
ecclesiastical.... [I]t did not and does not exist without the power of the state (or some
comparable social authority) to establish, define, regulate, and restrict it. Beyond such social
constructs, individuals may couple, but they do not 'marry."'); Richard D. Mohr. The Case for
Gay Marriage, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 215, 225 (1995) ("[Marriage is
entirely a creature of the law .... ). But see Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 514 (1994) (arguing that marriage as a legal entity has a "dual
character": that it is "a fundamental relationship that precedes the state" as well as a "state-
conferred legal status" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
161. See infra text accompanying notes 178-207.
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idea that incorporates the subordination of women, the idea that women can
be dominated, owned, and even brutalized by men. I argue that although
laws have changed, these changes serve only to reinforce women's
subordination in marriage, and that as states perpetuate the institution of
marriage, they perpetuate the old ideas that continue to burden the
institution.
Marriage is, without question, a state action. As the Supreme Court has
stated, "[W]e are unaware of any jurisdiction where private citizens may
covenant for or dissolve marriages without state approval." 16 That
approval may be contingent upon, for example, the respective ages 63 or
blood relation' 64 of the prospective bride and groom. The state may
recognize only those unions performed by certain people, such as justices of
the peace or ministers.' 6 Similarly, there is "state monopolization of the
means for legally dissolving [the marriage] relationship." 6 In short, it is
the state that decides whether and when a person may enter or leave a
marriage.67
This state regulation means that, as the Supreme Court wrote in 1888,
marriage is "something more than a mere contract.""66 Once two people
marry, a relation is created that they cannot change by themselves; while
other contracts may be modified or dissolved upon the consent of the
parties, in marriage the state "steps in and holds the parties to various
obligations and liabilities." 169 According to the Court, this state action is
appropriate because marriage is "an institution, in the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of
the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization
nor progress." 70 In many states, this conception of marriage has not
changed since 1888. Many courts still hold, as a North Carolina court
recently wrote, that
[t]he marriage relation is a peculiar and important one. The courts
treat it as a contract only in the sense that contract-consent of the
162. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371.376 (1971).
163. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-30 (1999).
164. See, e.g., id. § 46b-10.
165. See, e.g., id. § 46b-22.
166. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374.
167. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190. 205 (1888) ("Marriage. as creating the most
important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization ... than any other
institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age
at which parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute
marriage... and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution."). Maynard was cited
in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). for the proposition that" imlarriage is a social relation
subject to the State's police power."
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parties-precedes it and is essential to its validity. But, when
formed, it is more than a civil contract; it is a relation, an
institution, affecting not merely the parties, like business contracts,
but offspring particularly, and society generally.'1
7
Marriage is also, empirically, a dangerous institution for women.
Domestic violence remains a serious problem in this country, 7 1 and
marriage is a risky undertaking for a woman. This is not because marriage
is somehow naturally contentious and potentially dangerous for all
involved; rather, marriage is particularly dangerous for women. For
example, in 1992, at least 18% of female victims (roughly 622 out of 3454
female victims) of homicide were murdered by their husbands or ex-
husbands.173 In contrast, only 2.2% of male murder victims (that is, about
227 out of 10,351) were murdered by their wives or ex-wives. 74 There were
more women beaten by their husbands in 1990 than there were new
brides. 175 Leaving a marriage is also hazardous for women: For violent
crimes excluding murder, the victimization rate of women separated (but
not divorced) from their husbands was three times higher than that of
divorced women and twenty-five times higher than that of married (but not
separated) women. 176
To understand just which "obligations and liabilities" ' are attached to
marriage, and how these obligations and liabilities interact with violence
against women, I first examine the status of married women in the early
nineteenth century, when the woman's rights movement began. I then look
171. Poston v. Poston, 436 S.E.2d 854, 855-56 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v.
Hairston, 63 N.C. 451, 453 (1869)); see also, e.g., Klein v. Mayo, 367 F. Supp. 583, 585 (D.
Mass. 1973) (citing, inter alia, Maynard to support the proposition that " [miarriage has long been
held to be a social relation clearly subject to state regulation"); Carabetta v. Carabetta. 438 A.2d
109, 111 (Conn. 1980) ("Although a marital relationship is in its origins contractual, depending as
it does upon the consent of the parties, 'a contract of marriage is sui generis. It is simply
introductory to the creation of a status, and what that status is the law determines."' (citation
omitted)); Nelson v. Marshall, 869 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) ("[Mlarriage is a
contract as well as a status or a legal condition .... (emphasis added)); Creason v. Myers, 350
N.W.2d 526, 527 (Neb. 1984) ("Marriage results in a status."); Washington Statewide Org. of
Stepparents v. Smith, 536 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) (citing various sources.
including Maynard, to support the proposition that "marriage is a status"); State v. Austin, 234
S.E.2d 657, 662-63 (W. Va. 1977) ("The law has long recognized that while marriage is founded
on contractual principles, it is a status which society, acting through the State, fosters and
encourages.").
172. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
173. See BACHMAN & SALTZMAN, supra note 1, at 4. In 31% of murders, the relationship
between the victim and the murderer was not identified; thus the percentage of women murdered
by their husbands or ex-husbands could be as high as 49%. If, as is more likely, roughly 18% of
the unreported relationships were husband-wife relationships, then about 27% of female victims
of homicide were murdered by their husbands or ex-husbands. See id.
174. See id.
175. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 36 (1991).
176. See BACHMAN & SALTZMAN, supra note 1, at 4.
177. See supra text accompanying note 169.
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at how these laws changed and use Reva Siegel's work to argue that,
notwithstanding these changes, marriage as constituted by modem laws
continues, in many ways, to enforce a status regime, taking power away
from women and giving that power to men.
The law of marriage as the nineteenth-century woman's rights
movement knew it systematically subordinated women. Marriage was not
merely a contract between two people; it also created a status relationship,
one dealt with by the common-law doctrine of coverture. According to the
law of coverture, as Blackstone famously wrote, "[b]y marriage, the
husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing,
protection, and cover, she performs every thing" ' At common law, a wife
was "civilly dead" ;179 she had no right, for example, to bring tort actions or
to make contracts on her own.'80
This "civil death" extended to every aspect of a woman's life. When a
woman married in the early nineteenth century, her personal property
became her husband's property. He controlled any real estate she brought to
the marriage. He owned all wages she earned from work outside the
home."' Nor did women have any rights to their household labor, for they
did not have joint property rights in property or earnings acquired during
the course of a marriage."s
Even more strikingly, a wife did not have the right to control her own
body. At common law, a man was permitted to "chastise" his wife. Again,
Blackstone:
The husband also (by the old law) might give his wife moderate
correction. For, as he is to answer for her misbehaviour, the law
thought it reasonable to intrust him with this power of restraining
her, by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that a man
is allowed to correct his servants or children .... mhe courts of
178. 1 WILUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES *430 (footnote omitted).
179. ELzABETH CADY STANTON ET AL., DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS
AT THE FIRST WOMAN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION IN SENECA FALLS (1848). reprinted in PUBuc
WOMEN, supra note 38, at 190, 191.
180. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 178, at *43 1.
181. See Linda E. Speth, The Married Women's Property Acts, 1839.1865: Reform
Reaction, or Revolution?, in 2 WOMEN AND THE LAW: A SOcIAL HISTORIcAL PERSPECTIVE 69,
69 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1982).
182. See Reva B. Siegel Home as Work: The First %oman's Rights Claims Concerning
Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L. 1073. 1084-91 (1994) (discussing the lack of
joint property rights and the great value of women's home-based labor in the nineteenth century).
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law will still permit a husband to restrain a wife of her liberty, in
case of any gross misbehaviour.
83
In the nineteenth century,"8' marital rape was an oxymoron: Rape was,
by definition, something that a man did to someone not his spouse. As Lord
Chief Justice Matthew Hale proclaimed, "[T]he husband cannot be guilty
of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind
unto her husband, which she cannot retract." 185 Without the ability to
control when she had sex, a wife could not control when she became
pregnant or how many children she would have.
86
Each of these legal impediments has been transformed over the last 150
years. In the mid-1800s most states passed acts allowing married women to
own property; eventually, all states passed such acts.' 87 The Supreme Court
has held unconstitutional a Louisiana statute that gave a man, as "head and
master" of property jointly owned with his wife, the right to dispose of that
property without the wife's consent. 88 The right of a husband to "chastise"
his wife was out of favor even when Blackstone wrote,189 and was formally
repudiated by the end of the 1870s.' 9' Changes in the marital-rape
exemption were slower-to come: It is only within the last twenty years that
most states have modified their rape laws,' 9' and currently no state's laws
include an absolute marital-rape exemption.' 92 But a closer look shows that
these legal changes have not erased the unequal nature of marriage; to the
contrary, it can be argued that the new forms of law regarding marriage,
and the justifications for these new laws, serve only to reinforce marriage's
unequal impact and implications.
Take, for example, the evolution of laws regarding women's right to
their own work. Even though laws have changed to allow women the right
183. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 178, at *432-33 (footnotes omitted); see also Reva B.
Siegel, "The Rule of Love ": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy. 105 YALE L.J. 2117. 2121 -
29(1996).
184. And, indeed, well into the twentieth century. See infra text accompanying notes 191-
192.
185. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (London, Sollom
Emlyn 1736).
186. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 182, at 1105-06.
187. See Speth, supra note 181, at 70 (stating that by the end of the Civil War, 29 states had
passed acts permitting married women to own property).
188. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981).
189. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 178, at *433 ("[Wlith us, in the politer reign of Charles
the second, this power of correction began to be doubted: and a wife may now have secturity of the
peace against her husband .... (footnotes omitted)).
190. See Siegel, supra note 183, at 2129-30.
191. See Lisa Bernstein, Trends in Marital Rape Laws: Progress or Fagade?, 2 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 273, 273 (1992).
192. See Jennifer Gaffney, Note, Amending the Violence Against Women Act: Creating a
Rebuttable Presumption of Gender Animus in Rape Cases, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 247. 259 n.51 (1997).
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to the earnings from work outside the home, women still are unable to
contract for compensation for the work they perform in the household.'93 As
Reva Siegel argues, this bar on interspousal contracts for work performed
within the home is "far from an antiquarian relic of a prior regime of status.
Rather, it is the cornerstone of a new regime of status." "g' Courts now
refuse to enforce these contracts on the grounds that marital service is
"presumed gratuitous," "' and that there is a sphere into which courts may
not intrude.1 96 This reasoning has made interspousal agreements about
household labor "paradigmatically 'private,"' "9 an area in which most
couples would not even consider invoking the law. Thus work traditionally
performed by women in marriages goes uncompensated, leaving many
women "economically disempowered during the life of the marriage and
impoverished at divorce."' 98
Similarly, changes in the laws regarding "chastisement" and marital
rape actually served to reinforce violence against women by translating the
no-longer-acceptable language of marital unity into a more acceptable
discourse about family privacy.199 Indeed, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
drew on just this discourse when he criticized the Violence Against Women
Act for potentially "involv[ing] the federal courts in a whole host of
domestic relations disputes." ' Rehnquist conceived of domestic violence
as a family matter, not a crime. As Siegel convincingly shows, reform
movements do not necessarily erase subordination, but rather result in new
justifications for that subordination that are more acceptable to society and
thus perpetuate the subordination.2"'
To put it another way, facially neutral laws are not enough to exempt
states, the creators of marriages, from responsibility, because the de facto
reality of marriage encourages violence and subordination, even without
explicit de jure enforcement of that violence and subordination. As
Catharine MacKinnon explains in the context of judicial opinions, legal
"neutrality" is meaningless in the face of real inequality: "From women's
point of view, adjudications are already substantive; the view from nowhere
193. See Reva B. Siegel, 77te Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives'
Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEo. L.J. 2127, 2209 (1994) (" [N]o American court has ever
enforced such an agreement.").
194. Id at2171.
195. ld. at 2206 (citation omitted).
196. See id. at 2206-10.
197. Id. at 2209; see also id. at 2196-97 ("The principles courts developed at the turn of the
century to justify the prohibition on interspousal contracts for domestic labor still govern such
contracts today.").
198. Id. at2209.
199. See Siegel, supra note 183, at 2150-74.
200. William Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary,
THuRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 1, 3, quoted in Siegel. supra note 183. at 2174.
201. See Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L REv. 111 I, 1113 (1997).
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already has content." 202 In other words, if the law has created a de facto
system of inequality, a switch to de jure neutrality will not erase the
damage; it will simply stabilize the de facto inequality. The history and
reality of marriage are such that even neutrally framed laws (that is, the
elimination of most laws that facially favor men in marriage) cannot erase
subordination and violence engendered by marriage; because the state
continues to create and support marriage as an institution, it is complicit in
the resulting damage, notwithstanding the facially neutral laws it provides.
Finally, it is important to be aware of the extent to which the law has
not changed and continues explicitly to protect husbands who assault and
rape their wives. In many states, marital rape is still treated as a lesser crime
than other kinds of rape. For example, the punishment for marital rape may
be less stringent; in some states, a wife may prosecute a husband for rape
only if he uses force; and acts that would be crimes outside of marriage
(such as sexual battery) may not be considered crimes if committed within
203 thmarriage. And the Model Penal Code continues to define rape as a crime
committed by "[a] male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his
wife." 204
In short, marriage between a man and a woman partakes of a "cultural
constrct... of marital roles, obligations, and identities constituted by an
axis of subordination." 205 Marital life is weighted down with "the illiberal,
nonegalitarian, and unfree heritage of [marriage's] deeply patriarchal
past. ' '2 1 Marriage as it exists now is more than a contractual relationship
between two people: It is an ordering of social relations, an ordering that
places the woman squarely at the bottom, subject to the "stony, ancient
concept of ownership of women by men.2 Such an ordering affects
unmarried as well as married people, for every woman is a potential or an
actual wife, and every man knows that people like him have owned and
dominated people like her through an institution that continues to exist
202. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 167 (1989):
see also Siegel, supra note 183, at 2119 (introducing the term "preservation through
transformation" in the context of marriage law). Siegel suggests that the fact that "proving
discriminatory purpose [is] now.., required in all cases challenging [under the Equal Protection
Clause] facially neutral state action having a disparate impact on protected classes" is an example
of preservation through transformation. Siegel, supra note 201, at 1134.
203. See Gaffney, supra note 192, at 259 n.51. For more on marital rape, see, for example.
Lisa Dawgert Waggoner, New Mexico Joins the Twentieth Century: The Repeal of the Marital
Rape Exception, 22 N.M. L. REv. 551 (1992); and Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape.
and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990).
204. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (1998).
205. Robin West, Universalism, Liberal Theory, and the Problem of Gay Marriage, 25 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 705, 727 (1998).
206. Id.
207. Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes
and Troubles in the Nineties, I LAW & SEXUALITY 63, 70 (1991).
[Vol. 109: 783
2000] Nineteenth Amendment
today."5 Marriage, a state creation, continues to contribute to the
subordination of women even in its current facially neutral form.
The idea of marriage as state action is in the tradition of the Court's
finding state action where none is obvious in order to remedy
discrimination. The state does not simply sit by and watch as violent
marriages persist;' rather, states actively create the institution of marriage.
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the context-specific nature
of the state action inquiry.210 As I have shown, when marriage is viewed in
its historical and cultural context, it is revealed to be a "co-operative
force[" "21 that leads to a culture of violence against women, which in turn
interferes with women's political citizenship." 2 Congress may therefore act
under the Nineteenth Amendment to remedy the private components of
such violence.213
V. CONCLUSION: THE PROMISE OF THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT
The Nineteenth Amendment is notable for what it did not accomplish.
It did not lead to the establishment of a political party for women;24 it was
208. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
209. The situation is thus quite unlike that in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), in which the Court found that the state could not be held
responsible under the Fourteenth Amendment for not intervening when it knew that a child was
being brutally beaten by his father, since the failure to act did not constitute state action: "while
the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part
in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them." Id. at 201
(emphasis added). In contrast, the State does play a part in the creation of marriage; indeed, the
state alone can create a marriage. See supra notes 160-167 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) ("Only by
sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private
conduct be attributed its true significance."). A number of cases cite Burton for this proposition,
including, for example, Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 574 (1974); and Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296,299-300 (1966).
211. See supra text accompanying note 152.
212. See supra Part III.
213. Moreover, because the relevant state action is marriage, not the unequal enforcement of
criminal laws, VAWA does not threaten principles of federalism, as alleged by the only circuit
court to hold the civil rights provision of VAWA unconstitutional. See Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 888 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (stating that if
VAWA is allowed on the grounds that crimes against women are not properly prosecuted and
punished because of state gender bias, "the very same or similar legislative record of section
13891 could support an analogous finding that all state criminal laws are infused with gender
bias," leading to "a general federal criminal code to replicate or preempt the existing criminal
laws of the fifty States in order to root out any such bias"), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S.
Sept. 28, 1999) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29). Instead, when Congress addressed the private component of
the constitutional violation (that is, by allowing an action against a violent private party), instead
of directly addressing the state action (by, say, outlawing marriage), Congress displayed the
utmost respect for the fact that "[t]he power of the States [as opposed to the federal government]
over marriage and divorce is ... complete except as limited by specific constitutional provisions."
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 385 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring in the result).
214. See, e.g., ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRuGGLE 338 (rev. ed. 1975).
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not taken up by the Supreme Court to justify jury service for women;"' it
did not eliminate gender subordination.2"6 Indeed, woman suffrage has been
described as "the biggest non-event in our electoral history." 2 7 However,
the potential of the Nineteenth Amendment has not yet been tapped." 8 In
particular, Congress's role in enforcing the Nineteenth Amendment has not
received sufficient attention.1 9 Just as the Civil War amendments were not
expected to be self-enforcing,2  so too congressional action is needed to
realize fully the meaning of the Nineteenth Amendment. The problems of
gender subordination that prevent women from being full, political citizens
are too deeply rooted to be addressed only by the courts. Congress has the
power to take the steps needed to make good the promise of the Nineteenth
Amendment, and the Violence Against Women Act is one such step.
215. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (using the Equal
Protection Clause to justify a prohibition of discrimination on the basis of gender in the exercise
of peremptory challenges). See generally Amar, Jury Service. supra note 29 (discussing the link
between voting and jury service); Jennifer K. Brown, Note. The Nineteenth Amendment and
Women's Equality, 102 YALE L.J. 2175 (1993) (discussing the use of Nineteenth Amendment by
state courts as a basis for requiring that women be allowed to serve on juries).
216. See, e.g., Lind, supra note 27, at 210-11.
217. SHKLAR, supra note 30, at 60-61. She explains that "because women had adopted the
dominant attitudes of their time and place so completely, their final victory led to no noticeable
political change at all.... Those members of the suffrage movement who had seen it as an
instrument of social transformation were wholly unrealistic." Id.
218. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 215, at 2204 ("The Nineteenth Amendment was the
product of the revolutionary idea that women have equal status in a democracy. As a nation, we
are still pursuing this vision of equality, yet we have allowed this constitutional enactment only a
paltry existence .... Perhaps there is yet more this women's amendment to the Constitution can
accomplish .... (citation omitted)).
219. See, e.g., Lind, supra note 27, at 193-216 (focusing on the Supreme Court's role in
maintain[ing] and preserv[ing] ... the status quo" after passage of the Nineteenth Amendment);
Brown, supra note 215, passim (discussing the role of courts, particularly state courts, in giving
meaning to the Nineteenth Amendment).
220. See Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880) ("Some legislation is contemplated to
make the [Thirteenth and Fourteenth] amendments fully effective.").
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